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I. A SECULAR PROPHET? 
To speak of a ‘prophet of secularism’ appears at first glance to be a contradiction in 
terms. A prophet is usually said to be a person who, inspired by some supernatural 
agency, speaks on behalf of that supernatural agent, and, in some instances at least, 
predicts the future. Secularism is the view that what is morally right should be based 
on whatever promotes the well-being of sentient creatures in the physical world, to the 
exclusion of all considerations derived from a belief in the supernatural. A prophet is 
inspired by the supernatural; secularism declares the supernatural to be irrelevant; 
hence the contradiction in terms. According to Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), the 
utilitarian philosopher and reformer, the contradiction lay in ‘a source of illusion 
which pervades the whole system of technical religion, and by which the conceptive 
and judicial faculties of mankind have in a most deplorable degree been distorted and 
debilitated’. The Greek word from which the English word ‘to prophesy’ had been 
derived had two distinct meanings. The first and more extensive meaning was ‘to 
speak out’, or more generally ‘to discourse in an open manner’, whether in speech or 
in writing, and whether addressing a single person or a large crowd. The second and 
more limited sense was ‘to predict’ or ‘to foretell’, either in the sense of what the 
speaker thought would be likely to happen in the future, or what the speaker wished his 
hearers to believe would be likely to happen. ‘Religionists’, as Bentham termed 
believers in a supernatural supreme being, assigned to the word that one of the two 
meanings—either to speak out or to predict—that suited their purpose. Bentham 
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pointed out that in ‘the Church-of-England translation of the Bible’—that is in the 
Authorized King James Version—the verb ‘to prophesy’ did in fact appear in relation 
to both past and future events. An example of the former was where the blindfolded 
Jesus is mocked with the words: ‘Prophesy who is it that smote thee’,1 that is speak out 
and say who it was that hit you. 
 The ‘plain truth’, noted Bentham, was that the word ‘prophet’ as it appeared 
throughout the Bible was the equivalent of the modern word ‘statesman’. 
Now in the character of a Statesman it is scarce possible that, for any 
continuance, a man should discourse in either way without making reference, 
in some way or other, to time future as well as to time present and time past: 
nor can he speak of time future, that is of such events as to his eyes present 
themselves as likely to have place in time future, without being as to so much a 
predictor of future events, and, in that other and narrower sense, a prophet. 
 
A statesman who proposed or opposed a measure would necessarily refer to its 
probable effects and consequences, and so could not avoid being a predictor of future 
events, and hence a prophet. Leaving inspiration aside, none of the authors of the so-
called prophecies that appeared in the English translation of the Bible had any better 
title to the name of ‘prophet’ than ‘almost every modern Statesman whose name 
appears in the Parliamentary Debates’. In fact, the advantage lay very much the 
modern statesmen, and even with the ‘most insignificant writer’ of a newspaper article 
or pamphlet. 
Why? Because in the discourses of the most ordinary writer of the present day 
scarcely will you find any one of a length equal to that of the shortest of those 
of the so called Jewish Prophets, in which there exists not something distinct 
and specific, something that is presented in a shape more or less tangible, 
something that presents a determinate import of some sort or other, good or 
bad: whereas in those Jewish prophets may be seen page after page in which no 
determinate import is presented—nothing to which the appellation of reasoning 
can, with any tolerable approach to propriety, be applied. Lamentation, 
vituperation, with or without prediction—all of them floating in the air, scarce 
in any of them any thing by which any thing in the shape of information—
deliberate information—true or false, good or bad, is conveyed. 
                                                 
1
 Luke 22: 64. 
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Bentham complained that translations of the Bible had confounded the two senses of 
the word ‘prophesy’, that is the sense of ‘speaking out’ and the sense of ‘prediction’, 
and that modern religious commentators had interpreted as many propositions as 
possible as predictions. These predictions, it was then assumed, had emanated ‘in a 
supernatural, unexplained and inexplicable manner’ from God himself, and the person 
who had spoken or written down the prediction in question had been ‘dignified ... with 
the title of prophet’.2 Hence, to refer to Bentham as the ‘prophet of secularism’ is to 
refer to him in the sense of one who speaks out as an advocate of secularism—that 
theology should have no influence over morals and legislation. ‘In point of utility’, 
wrote Bentham, ‘a book of Cookery might as well be interlarded with ejaculations, as a 
book of Jurisprudence with theological speculations. It might indeed better: for the 
devotions in a book of Cookery would only be useless: In a book of Jurisprudence it 
can certainly do no good, and it is a thousand to one but ... it does mischief.’3 
 Bentham turned against religion in his early teenage years, in the early 1760s, 
while a student at the University of Oxford. His anti-religious views had either been 
formed by the time that, in 1764 and aged 16, he was required to subscribe to the 
Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England in order to take his degree, or were 
formed by that experience. However, it was not until the 1810s that Bentham devoted a 
large proportion of his time and effort to producing a sustained attack on religion.
4
 We 
are only now beginning to appreciate the full extent of Bentham’s religious views, in 
that we are in the midst of producing for the first time accurate transcripts of 
                                                 
2
 University College London Library, Bentham Papers [hereafter UC], Box clxi, fos. 77–8, 80–3 (9 
March 1818). 
3
 UC lxix. 139 (c. 1776). 
4
 See Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: the Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford, 2006, 
pp. 171–6. 
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Bentham’s voluminous manuscript writings on the subject.5 The passage I have 
discussed on prophecy is taken from unpublished material headed ‘Not Paul, but 
Jesus’, which is currently being edited as part of the new authoritative edition of The 
Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham’s Not Paul, but Jesus was published 
pseudonymously in 1823,
6
 but this constituted only the first part of a much larger 
work. The remainder of the work exists in manuscript in the Bentham Papers in 
University College London Library, and it is on this material that much of the present 
lecture is based. Bentham comments on the enduring influence of what he termed the 
principle of asceticism, and presents extraordinarily outspoken views—as one would 
expect from a prophet—on religion and sexual morality. Bentham believed that 
attitudes to the gratification of the sexual appetite in his own time were rooted in the 
Mosaic law and, more importantly, in the teachings of St Paul. Bentham’s aim was to 
throw off the grip of religion from all areas of public life, and he regarded sexual 
morality as one of the fields in which a critical battle would need to be fought. 
 
II. FOUR STORIES 
From a historical point of view, Bentham’s writings for ‘Not Paul, but Jesus’ have an 
important place in at least four narratives that can be told about the emergence of a 
secular view of the world. The first is the place that Bentham in general, and this 
material in particular, might have in the transmission of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, as interpreted by Jonathan Israel in his monumental three-volume 
                                                 
5
 For earlier treatments of Bentham’s religious views see James Steintrager, ‘Language and Politics: 
Bentham on Religion’, The Bentham Newsletter, IV (1980), 4–20; James E. Crimmins, Secular 
Utilitarianism: Social Science and the Critique of Religion in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford, 
1990; and Delos B. McKown, Behold the Antichrist: Bentham on Religion, Amherst, NY, 2004. 
6
 Gamaliel Smith, Not Paul, but Jesus, London, 1823. This work, like Bentham’s other writings on 
religion, was excluded from the nineteenth-century edition of his works edited by his literary executor 
John Bowring: see The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1838–43 
(reissued as a whole in 1843). 
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study of the philosophy of the Enlightenment,
7
 into demands for political, legal, and 
social reform. Israel distinguishes between the thought of the moderate, anti-
democratic Enlightenment and that of the radical, democratic Enlightenment. The 
Radical Enlightenment was inspired by the philosophy of Spinoza: ‘On Spinoza’s 
principles, society would become more resistant to being manipulated by religious 
authority, autocracy, powerful oligarchies and dictatorship, and more democratic, 
libertarian and egalitarian.’8 The Radical Enlightenment, according to Israel, aimed to 
separate philosophy, science, and morality from theology, looked to ground morality 
on secular criteria alone and especially on the notion of equality, supported freedom of 
thought, expression, and the press, and advocated democracy as the best form of 
government.
9
 A ‘revolution of the mind’ took place in the 1770s and 1780s, when the 
radical philosophes gained the intellectual ascendancy over the moderates, and paved 
the way for the ‘revolution of fact’ that was most momentously exemplified in the 
French Revolution.
10
 Israel’s interpretation helps to make sense of Bentham’s 
emergence as a radical thinker who was opposed to the influence of the Church, and of 
theology more generally, in public affairs, and who came to support democracy based 
on a theory of equality.
11
 The first narrative, therefore, that might be told about the 
material discussed here concerns Bentham’s role in converting the agenda of the 
Radical Enlightenment into a mainstream programme for practical reform. 
 The second narrative concerns the place of this material in the emergence of a 
philosophy of sexual liberty. As Louis Crompton points out, the law against 
                                                 
7
 Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750, 
Oxford, 2001; Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–
1752, Oxford, 2006; and Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–
1790, Oxford, 2011. For a helpful summary see Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical 
Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy, Princeton and Oxford, 2010. 
8
 Israel, Revolution of the Mind, p. 2. 
9
 Ibid., pp. 20–1. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 37–9. 
11
 See Schofield, Utility and Democracy, pp. 137–70. 
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homosexuality, which had been a capital offence since 1533, was increasingly 
enforced in eighteenth-century England. Despite high standards of proof demanded by 
the courts (penetration and emission), there was an average of two executions per year 
in the thirty years following 1806. For those who avoided being charged with the 
capital offence, there was the lesser offence of ‘assault with attempt to commit 
sodomy’, which was punished by the pillory. Given the popular wrath displayed 
against homosexuals, the pillory could itself be a sentence of death. This was at a time 
when, in Europe more generally, penal laws against sodomy were being relaxed, and 
executions becoming more rare. In France, for instance, sodomy was decriminalized in 
1791.
12
 The tone for English persecution was set by William Blackstone in 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in 1765–9, based on lectures 
delivered at the University of Oxford, which quickly established itself as the standard 
guide to English law. Blackstone referred to ‘the infamous crime against nature, 
committed either with man or beast’, an offence of ‘still deeper malignity’ than rape, 
‘the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature’, and therefore best treated as 
‘a crime not fit to be named’. It was a crime that ‘the voice of nature and of reason, and 
the express law of God, determine to be capital’. The express law of God was revealed 
in Leviticus 20: 13, 15. The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, moreover, which 
took place ‘long before the Jewish dispensation’, proved that ‘this is an universal, not 
merely a provincial precept’.13 ‘The hard fact was’, notes Crompton, ‘that both learned 
and popular opinion in England was overwhelmingly on Blackstone’s side.’14 
 In Crompton’s account, Bentham emerges as the ‘spokesman of a silent and 
invisible minority’, a minority that Crompton estimates at several hundreds of 
                                                 
12
 Louis Crompton, Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in 19
th
-Century England, London, 1985, pp. 
14–18. 
13
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxford, 1765–9, iv. 215–16. 
14
 Crompton, Byron and Greek Love, pp. 18–19, 21–2. 
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thousands. Bentham argued that no action should be established as a criminal offence 
unless it caused harm. Homosexuality, where there was consent, caused no harm, and 
should, therefore, be decriminalized. ‘Nowhere did utilitarian ethics’, states Crompton, 
‘yield more devastating results than in its application to sexual morality.’15 Bentham 
was the one significant systematic philosopher who was prepared to defend the 
decriminalization of homosexuality. Crompton’s interpretation links with Faramerz 
Dabhoiwala’s account of the emergence in England of an intellectual case for sexual 
freedom between 1660 and 1800. For centuries sex outside marriage (fornication) had 
been illegal, and individuals had been punished accordingly. From the later 
seventeenth century and through the eighteenth century, the balance began to shift 
towards sexual freedom, so that the view that ‘sexual activity outside marriage should 
be regarded as a private matter, not subject to public regulation or punishment’ came 
to be articulated in a manner that was increasingly ‘sophisticated, public, and 
influential’.16 Dabhoiwala draws attention to Bentham’s significance as an advocate of 
sexual freedom, and comments that it is ‘remarkable how little notice’ Bentham’s 
work has received, and how scholars have failed to relate it to the wider intellectual 
currents of the age.
17
 Hence, the second narrative concerns the increasing demand for 
sexual freedom in relation to heterosexual activity, and Bentham’s even more radical 
demand that such freedom be extended to all forms of sexual activity at a time when 
homosexuals were facing more stringent persecution than ever before. 
 The third narrative concerns the place of this material in the development of 
Biblical criticism. Bentham explained that he had adopted the method of ‘historical 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., pp. 26–9. 
16
 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, ‘Lust and Liberty’, Past and Present, CCVII (2010), 89–179, at 88–92. 
17
 Ibid. 168. Dabhoiwala’s view (ibid. 175) that Israel’s attribution of the emergence of sexual liberty to 
the radical strand of the Enlightenment is problematic, since the historical process was not the outcome 
of a coherent, philosophical programme, presumably needs modifying in relation to Bentham, since he 
did develop such a coherent, philosophical programme. 
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criticism’, which, ‘like every other branch of the art and science of logic’, had been ‘a 
plant of tardy growth’. The earliest compilers of historical materials, whether sacred or 
profane, had given ‘an undiscriminating and equal acceptance’ to ‘materials of all 
kinds and qualities’. It had not been until recently that attention had been paid to the 
credibility of historical sources through consideration of such factors as whether the 
authors had been eye-witnesses, whether they had written contemporaneously with the 
events they related, and where in terms of geographical location they had written in 
relation to those events.
18
 Bentham announced that he would treat the Bible as he 
would any other historical document, and bring the same sort of historical criticism to 
bear on it as might be applied to any other text. Hence, 
Throughout the whole course of the present examination, the men in question 
will, all of them, be alike considered as actuated by human interests, human 
desires, [and] human motives—actuated by such interests, desires and motives 
as all men in general are actuated by.
19
 
 
Bentham was writing in the 1810s at a time when Biblical criticism had made some 
headway in Germany, but was virtually unknown in England.
20
 Bentham’s approach 
amounted to a forensic examination of the Biblical accounts: he tried to explain the 
actions of the historical persons portrayed in them according to the observed principles 
of human behaviour and regularities of the natural world, and to distinguish the reality 
from what we would today call the ‘spin’. Furthermore, part of his purpose was to 
show not only the inconsistencies within the texts themselves, but the inconsistencies 
between the texts on the hand, and the beliefs and practices of religionists of his own 
day on the other. 
                                                 
18
 UC cxlix. 216 (21 September 1815). 
19
 UC cxlix. 219 (10 September 1817). 
20
 See, for instance, Thomas Albert Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W.M.L. de Wette, 
Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness, 
Cambridge, 2000; and David M. Thompson, Cambridge Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Enquiry, 
Controversy and Truth, Aldershot, 2008. 
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 The fourth narrative concerns the place of this material in the emergence of 
atheism, or rather of agnosticism.
21
 Bentham has often been described as an atheist, but 
such a label misrepresents his position. Perhaps the main evidence for the view that 
Bentham was an atheist is derived from the arguments developed in Analysis of the 
Influence of Natural Religion, published pseudonymously in 1822.
22
 This work was 
written by George Grote, using Bentham’s manuscripts. Grote was a closet atheist, 
and, insofar as there are any atheistic tendencies in Analysis, it might plausibly be 
suggested that they be attributed to Grote rather than to Bentham.
23
 Bentham’s view 
was that, since all knowledge was founded on our experience of the natural world 
derived from our sense-perception, there could, by definition, be no knowledge of 
anything supernatural. Hence, to speak about God, his attributes, or his activities, was 
to speak nonsense. The term God was merely a sound, for there was no known thing to 
which it related. It was just as nonsensical to say that God existed as it was to say that 
God did not exist. Bentham saw religion as a great instrument of terror, oppression, 
and human misery. He believed that religion promoted unhappiness in the present life, 
and since human beings could have no knowledge of any future life, or indeed of 
anything supernatural, any talk of reward in such a future life was also nonsensical.
24
 
Hence, the fourth narrative relates Bentham’s ‘Not Paul, but Jesus’ to the emergence 
of atheism and agnosticism. 
 
III. PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
                                                 
21
 For a general account see David Berman, A History of Atheism in Britain: from Hobbes to Russell, 
London, 1988. 
22
 Philip Beauchamp, Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of 
Mankind, London, 1822. 
23
 See Berman, History of Atheism, pp. 192–4; and Catherine Fuller, ‘Bentham, Mill, Grote, and an 
Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind’, Journal of 
Bentham Studies, X (2008), at http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1322983/ 
24
 See Philip Schofield, ‘Political and Religious Radicalism in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham’, History 
of Political Thought, XX (1999), 272–91). 
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Before proceeding to examine Bentham’s interpretation of St Paul’s doctrines and 
motives, it will be helpful to give a brief account of his exposition of the principle of 
utility and its opposite, the principle of asceticism. In Bentham’s view, the desire for 
pleasure and the aversion to pain were the sole motives to conduct. In other words, 
every action performed by a sentient creature was motivated by either a desire to 
experience some pleasure or to avoid some pain. In the field of human psychology, 
terms such as happiness and suffering did not make sense unless they were related to 
sensations of pain and pleasure: a person was happy when he or she was experiencing 
a balance of pleasure over pain, and in a state of misery or suffering when 
experiencing a balance of pain over pleasure. In the field of ethics or morality, terms 
such as good and evil did not make sense unless they were also explained in terms of 
pleasure and pain: hence, good consisted in pleasure and exemption from pain, and in 
nothing else, while evil consisted in pain and loss of pleasure, and in nothing else. An 
action was right and proper if it produced a balance on the side of pleasure or 
happiness, and wrong if it produced a balance on the side of pain or suffering. If a 
person believed that he or she would gain pleasure from performing some action or 
seeing some state of affairs brought about, he or she was said to have an interest in 
performing that action or bringing about that state of affairs. 
 Each person, then, was motivated to pursue his or her own happiness. Yet 
many actions affected not only the person or persons acting, but other persons as well. 
When judging whether an action was right or wrong, one had to account for all the 
pleasures and pains produced by the action in question. This meant not merely taking 
into account the pleasures and pains of the actor or actors, but every single person 
affected by the action. The right and proper course of action was that which promoted 
the most pleasure in the most people—in other words ‘the greatest happiness of the 
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greatest number’. To accept this standard of right and wrong was to be an adherent of 
the principle of utility. Bentham later became dissatisfied with the term ‘utility’ 
because it did not easily bring to mind the idea of happiness, and so came to prefer the 
term ‘greatest happiness principle’—but the principle of utility, and utilitarianism, are 
the terms that have stuck. In summary, an adherent of the principle of utility was a 
person who approved of those actions that increased pleasure and diminished pain.
25
 
 In contrast to an adherent of the principle of utility, an adherent of the principle 
of asceticism approved of those actions that increased pain and diminished pleasure. 
Bentham noted that if one tenth of the inhabitants of the world pursued the principle of 
asceticism consistently, ‘in a day’s time they will have turned it into a hell’. It had 
nevertheless been pursued by two classes of people. The first were the Stoic 
philosophers, who had pursued the principle in the hope of furthering their reputation, 
which was in fact a source of pleasure. The second were religionists, who had 
‘frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain’, and 
who had been motivated by ‘the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic 
and revengeful Deity’. There was, therefore, a contradiction in the practice of those 
who adhered to the principle of asceticism: they took the view that by experiencing 
pain in the short term, they would either experience pleasure or avoid greater pain in 
the longer term or in the hereafter.
26
 
 There was a third principle—the principle of sympathy and antipathy. All other 
moral principles, whether called, for instance, natural law, right reason, common 
sense, or justice, were variants of this principle. The adherent of the principle of 
sympathy and antipathy raised his own likes and dislikes—his or her own desires and 
aversions—into a moral standard, in order to achieve his or her own ends, or the ends 
                                                 
25
 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and 
H.L.A. Hart, London, 1970, pp. 11–16. 
26
 Ibid., pp. 17–21. 
Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism—05/11/2012—Page 12 
of the party or group to which he or she belonged, whatever the consequence for the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. While the adherent of the principle of utility 
took into account the interests of all the persons affected by the action under 
consideration, the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy took into 
account no more than his or her own interest, or at most the interests of some group or 
class smaller than that of the whole number of persons affected.
27
 As we shall see, 
Bentham argued that Paul had advocated the principle of asceticism in order to 
promote his own selfish interests—Paul was really a disguised adherent of the 
principle of sympathy and antipathy. 
 
IV. PAUL’S DOCTRINES 
The key figure in the promotion of the principle of asceticism, and therefore the person 
whose influence Bentham was most keen to undermine, was Paul. Bentham’s strategy 
for doing this was to show that Paul’s religion was not the religion of Jesus. By 
showing the ways in which Paul’s teachings differed from and contradicted those of 
Jesus, he hoped to persuade Christians to reject Paul’s teachings—hence the title ‘Not 
Paul, but Jesus’. Having done that, he would turn his attention to Jesus, and show how 
Jesus was not the Son of God (whatever that might mean), but rather a revolutionary 
who hoped to establish himself as King of Judaea, and whose kingdom, after his 
failure and death, was ‘spiritualized’ by his followers into a heavenly kingdom. Jesus’s 
teachings, imbued as they were with Epicureanism, had some value, but not nearly so 
much as those of the modern Epicurean, Bentham.
28
 
 In that part of Not Paul, but Jesus published in 1823, Bentham argued that Paul 
was a fraud—his so-called conversion on the road to Damascus was a stratagem 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., pp. 21–31. 
28
 UC clxi. 227 (19 October 1817). 
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designed to establish his authority to speak on behalf of Jesus. Paul had then done a 
deal—entered into a partition treaty—with the Disciples: the latter would confine 
themselves to the Jews, while Paul would be left free to proselytize the Gentiles.
29
 
Paul’s object was personal advancement—to obtain as much wealth, power, and 
reputation for himself as possible. Paul saw an opportunity to achieve his ambition by 
exploiting the religion already established by the adherents of Jesus. He recognized 
that the existing eleven Disciples of Jesus did not have the capacity to extend their 
influence beyond the Jewish community, whereas he, being ‘not simply a Jew’, but 
also a Greek, and well versed in both divinity and law, was capable of taking the 
religion of Jesus to the Gentiles. The problem, in Bentham’s view, did not lie in Paul’s 
ambition as such, but in the pernicious effects of the doctrines that he advanced. 
Bentham identified four main doctrines in Paul’s Epistles: 
1. Magnification of faith absolutely considered. 
 2. Magnification of faith in contradistinction to works: viz. ... the 
peculiar points of the Jewish law. 
 3. Cacodæmonism: i.e. holding up to view the Almighty in a terrific 
character. 
 4 Asceticism. Enjoining, under the notion of their being offensive to the 
Almighty, the sacrifice of gratifications in themselves innoxious.
30
 
 
In relation to the magnification of faith, Bentham explained that, by faith, what Paul 
meant was ‘persuasion of the truth of the doctrines which he was occupied in the 
delivery of’, and in particular the persuasion that they in fact expressed the will of 
Jesus.
31
 In relation to Paul’s strategy of promoting faith at the expense of works, 
Bentham pointed out that by ‘works’ Paul meant the ceremonies and rites required by 
Jewish law and religion, not good works in general as it had come to be interpreted in 
the Christian tradition.
32
 Bentham summarized Paul’s strategy as follows: ‘Works 
                                                 
29
 See Schofield, Utility and Democracy, pp. 193–8. 
30
 UC clxi. 143–4, 155–6 (23 August 1817). 
31
 UC clxi. 157–9 (23 August 1817). 
32
 UC clxi. 160 (August 1817). 
Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism—05/11/2012—Page 14 
nothing; faith every thing. Such, from beginning to end, is the burthen of his song.’ 
Paul recognized that if men put their trust in works, their trust was not in him. The 
ostensible object of the faith was Jesus, but the real object was Paul.
33
 
 Paul needed to make his followers have faith in him, in order to instil 
obedience in them. He could not, however, pretend to be himself the author of ‘the 
system of reward and punishment on the eventual expectation of which his influence 
was dependent’. Paul had to present God as the author, and Jesus ‘either as specially 
commissioned from God’, or better still ‘as himself God or part and parcel of God’, 
with himself as Jesus’s ‘specially commissioned emissary’.34 In presenting an image of 
God, it suited Paul’s purpose to promote the doctrine of cacodæmonism, that is to 
emphasize the attributes of ‘formidableness and incomprehensibility’. 
On the degree of formidableness depended the force of the instrument of 
influence he was occupied in the application of: on the degree of 
incomprehensibility, the assurance of working that instrument in such manner 
as to turn it to the best account in and for the furtherance of his own personal 
and carnal ends. 
 
In short, God would distribute rewards and punishments in an afterlife. Paul was the 
interpreter of God’s will. In order to enjoy the rewards and avoid the punishments, 
men had to do as Paul told them.
35
 Paul’s aim was to preach faith without a basis in 
evidence—in other words to instil ‘credulity’. Paul wanted his followers to develop ‘a 
proneness to believe extraordinary things’, and that simply because he himself asserted 
them to be true.
36
 
Faith in the abstract—abstraction made of the adequacy of the grounds on 
which it is built—is neither more nor less than credulity: in so far, then, as by 
hopes or fears, by exhortations which are but invitations, [and by] commands 
with threatenings and promises in the back-ground, a man can be engaged to 
nourish in himself a disposition to credulity—to take extraordinary things upon 
                                                 
33
 UC clxi. 162 (27 August 1817). 
34
 UC cxli. 145–6 (11 September 1817). 
35
 UC clxi. 151–2 (12 September 1817). 
36
 UC cxli. 146 (11 September 1817). 
Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism—05/11/2012—Page 15 
trust upon the mere word of him by whom they are delivered, although a 
stranger—the general object—this part of the object—is accomplished. 
 
Hence, the inculcation of credulity, or ‘faith in the abstract’, was the central feature of 
Paul’s teachings. Once Paul had instilled credulity into his followers, they would give 
‘indiscriminate acceptance to truth and imposture’. Truth did not need to be supported 
by credulity, and so all that such preaching as Paul’s did was ‘to procure acceptance 
for imposture: to deliver men’s minds bound into the hands of interested and 
prædatory impostors’.37 
 Bentham did not simply reject the notion of faith as nonsense, but presented a 
secular exposition of the term. He argued that faith, properly understood, was belief 
founded on an evidence-based assessment of probabilities: 
What is meant by faith is belief, persuasion: the quantity of the faith is in the 
intensity of the persuasion, and of the intensity of persuasion, if any 
determinate measure, or so much as any precise and determinate idea, be to be 
found, it will be found in what is called the doctrine of chances: an event or 
state of things being given, the intensity of the persuasion of its existence will 
be as the number of chances in favour of its existence to the number of chances 
in favour of its non-existence, according to the estimate made on the subject by 
him whose persuasion is in question.
38
 
 
Belief, therefore, was ‘an act of the judgment’. Belief based on ‘good grounds’ was 
both the result of and proof of ‘the soundness of the judgment’, but 
pronounced on bad or inadequate grounds, it is the result of weakness in that 
same part of the mental frame: pronounced on no grounds at all, it is the result 
of still greater—of still more prostrate—weakness, and the more prostrate he 
[i.e. the person believing] has been, the fitter and more likely he is to be made 
an instrument of evil—of mischief not only to himself, but to others—in the 
hands of knaves and impostors—more especially of that class who take the 
field of religion for the field of their imposture.... 
 
The inculcation of credulity—of belief on false or on no grounds—led to the 
perversion of the judgment by the will. The influence of the will on the judgment was 
beneficial insofar as it impartially directed attention towards all the considerations 
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relevant to a particular issue, but in the case of religion, where the attention was 
typically directed to the considerations on one side of the question alone, with those on 
the opposite side being ignored, its influence was pernicious.
39
 
 Paul’s strategy undermined the ‘unbiased operation of the understanding’, that 
is the judgment, by the linking of merit to faith: the greater the faith, the greater the 
praise received. Faith, in Paul’s sense, became ‘belief either against evidence or at best 
without evidence’: there was no merit in believing in accord with the appropriate 
evidence. Yet to judge against or without evidence, remarked Bentham, was plain 
folly. The strength of a man’s faith was proportional to the strength of the command 
obtained by his will over his judgment. The only measure of the degree to which such 
control existed was the absurdity of his belief, and there was nothing more absurd than 
a self-contradictory proposition: ‘This, therefore, is the point to which, on the part of 
the believer in the merit of faith, all exertions—all efforts—tend.’ Two examples of 
self-contradictory propositions were the proposition that one God was made up of 
three Gods (Trinitarianism), and the proposition that one and the same object was 
eaten and not eaten at the same time (transubstantiation). ‘Fitter propositions for a man 
to die for, rather than contradict them,’ remarked Bentham, ‘the power of imagination 
can not frame to itself.’ The apparent paradox, noted Bentham, that the human mind 
could be brought to the condition in which the greater the absurdity of a proposition, 
the more easily and eagerly it would be accepted, and more obstinately maintained and 
defended, was ‘no more than the natural, and not only the natural but the necessary, 
consequence of a steady and consistent belief in the maxim, notion or persuasion of the 
meritoriousness of faith’.40 
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 Hence, the strength of religious faith was ‘[p]roportioned not to the 
reasonableness’ of the proposition, but to the intensity with which the preacher 
appeared to believe it, and then maintained by its nonsensicalness. Paul’s success 
during his lifetime had been due ‘to the energy, seconded by the nonsensicalness, of 
his discourses’, and the same qualities had maintained his influence down to the 
present. These were the qualities that had produced his ‘triumph’, namely ‘the having 
supplanted, on pretence of supporting, the religion of Jesus’.41 
 
V. PAUL’S ASCETICISM 
Paul, like the preacher of any new religion, saw ‘in every pursuit in which his wished-
for disciples are engaged or liable to be engaged, a source of rivalry, opposition, and 
competition’. The ferocity of the competition was proportional to the strength of the 
propensity.
42
 There were two main ‘rival pursuits’ against which Paul had to 
contend—one spiritual and one carnal. The spiritual consisted in the fulfilment of the 
duties imposed by the Mosaic law, and the carnal in pleasures of all sorts.
43
 The 
propensity that Paul feared the most, because it was the strongest, was ‘the sexual 
appetite’, and it was against this that ‘his hostile endeavours’ were ‘pushed with 
greatest force and energy’. 44 Paul found no support in the acts or sayings of Jesus for 
his condemnation of the sexual appetite, but he did find support in a ‘counter-
propensity’ that had been ‘established to a certain degree in men’s breasts’, namely 
‘the love of distinction’. Bentham had in mind the philosophy of the Stoics, by whom 
both pleasures and pains had been held in equal contempt. The more valuable the 
sacrifice made, the greater the distinction bestowed on the individual who had made it. 
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‘For the sake of this brilliant acquisition,’ remarked Bentham, ‘how numerous the 
instances in which life itself—life the field within which pleasures of all sorts and sizes 
are included—had been sacrificed!’45 
 A second factor worked in Paul’s favour. Jesus had promised, as a reward, a 
future life full of happiness without end. At the time, in both the Jewish and the Greek 
mind, the idea of sacrifice was associated with the Almighty, and hence it was 
assumed that, without sacrifice, such a benefit could not be obtained. It was further 
assumed that the greater the sacrifice, the greater the chance of obtaining the benefit, 
and so, for even the smallest chance of obtaining such a benefit, no sacrifice could be 
too great. There could be no greater sacrifice than ‘[t]he gratification belonging to the 
sexual appetite’. Total abstinence from food or drink would be suicide, and so there 
was no plausible rival to the sacrifice of sexual gratification. Hence, it was sexual 
gratification that was prohibited, and sanctioned ‘by a punishment the magnitude of 
which was to be proportioned to the value of the sacrifice’.46 
 Bentham ranked the violence of Paul’s attack on various sexual practices as 
follows: 
In the order of vituperation and proscription, first accordingly, under the name 
of uncleanness,
47
 came the gratification when obtained either without the help 
of any co-operator, or when obtained with a co-operator of the same sex:
48
 next 
comes the gratification in the case when obtained in the more generally 
preferred mode with the co-operation of a person of the correspondent and 
opposite sex, but without the sanction of marriage….49 
 
Paul told the Corinthians that ‘it is good for a man not to touch a woman’.50 This was 
as much as to say that it was ‘Good that no man should be born: better still had none 
                                                 
45
 UC cxli. 189 (1 September 1817). 
46
 UC clxi. 190 (1 September 1817). 
47
 Bentham had in mind Ephesians 5: 3. 
48
 Bentham had in mind Romans 1: 26–32. 
49
 UC cxli. 188 (1 September 1817). 
50
 I Corinthians 7: 1. 
Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism—05/11/2012—Page 19 
been ever born.’51 This proposition did not merely refer to fornication, but to ‘the 
union of the sexes under any circumstances’.52 ‘Generally and radically bad, therefore, 
according to Paul, is all union of the sexes. A thing ever to be desired is, therefore, that 
every where there shall be as little of it as possible.’53 Paul’s advice, where individuals 
had not married or were widowed, was that they should abstain from sex, so long as 
they could manage to do so. If they could not abstain—‘if they cannot contain’—they 
would be permitted to marry, on the grounds that it was ‘better’ (that is less bad, 
glossed Bentham) ‘to marry than to burn’. Where married couples were concerned, not 
content to leave the ‘peace of the marriage bed’ undisturbed, Paul advised them to 
abstain from sexual gratification unless one or other of them insisted on it, and to 
devote themselves to fasting and praying. In order to prevent them from being tempted 
by Satan, Paul gave them his permission to ‘come together again’.54 One consequence 
of Paul’s doctrine—‘this really unnatural doctrine’—was ‘the forced celibacy of the 
Romish clergy’. Bentham was indignant: ‘Behold the spawn of Paul—all these men of 
chastity, whether real or pretended, with which the Catholic part of the world is 
infested: in the male votaries behold the instruments and accomplices of his 
successors, in the females the victims.’55 
 
VI. JESUS’S SEXUALITY 
Bentham claimed that, unlike Paul, Jesus did not, according to any account that 
appeared in the four Gospels, condemn either the pleasures of the table or the pleasures 
of the bed.
56
 On the contrary, Jesus’s opposition to asceticism was shown in his 
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condemnation of the Mosaic law in Matthew 9: 9–17. Disciples of John the Baptist 
came to Jesus, and asked: ‘Why do we and the Pharisees fast oft, but thy disciples fast 
not?’ Jesus replied with two parables: first, that no one put a piece of new cloth into an 
old garment; and second, that no one should put new wine into old bottles, since the 
bottles break and the wine runs out. In the first parable, argued Bentham, Jesus drew 
attention to the badness of the Mosaic law, the old garment. John the Baptist’s attempt 
to perfect the Mosaic law by abstaining from food was to put a patch on the old 
garment, and thus only made it worse. In the second parable, Jesus introduced what he 
regarded as the true doctrine. The old bottle represented the Mosaic law. By adding 
more asceticism to the old law—by putting new wine into old bottles (or rather skins, 
as Bentham pointed out, since the ‘bottles’ in question were not made of glass)—the 
whole system would be ‘blown to pieces’—the old bottles would burst—and any good 
that it contained would be ‘scattered and lost’. Put new wine—the new doctrine—into 
new bottles, and nothing was lost. The new bottle represented the religion of Jesus, and 
the new wine was the abolition of asceticism. Hence, while John the Baptist attempted 
to strain the old asceticism ‘still tighter than before’, Jesus condemned it. Yet in 
Bentham’s own day, he complained, the ‘hypocrisy of the Pharisees’, despite the 
condemnation of Jesus, was ‘held in honour, ... pursued and imitated’.57 
 ‘We come now’, remarked Bentham, ‘to a ground of extreme delicacy.’58 As 
noted above, Bentham pointed out that Paul’s most forceful condemnation was 
directed towards homosexuality. Bentham responded that not only had Jesus never 
condemned homosexuality, but that he had probably engaged in it. There were, 
moreover, many females in Jesus’s immediate circle, and again Bentham saw no 
reason why Jesus might not have engaged in heterosexual activity as well. Not 
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accepting that there was any sense in the proposition that Jesus was God, or part of 
God, Bentham saw Jesus as a historical figure. Given that, in the Greco-Roman 
classical world, sex between males was not condemned as such, but under certain 
circumstances accepted as normal, Bentham saw no reason why Jesus might not have 
taken the same view. According to Christian teaching, the story of the destruction of 
Sodom and Gomorrah showed that God condemned homosexual activity. Bentham 
argued that what the Bible condemned was the force that was used and the number of 
people involved—it was not homosexuality that was condemned, but gang rape. 
Bentham, moreover, pointed to positive, or at least non-condemnatory, accounts of 
homosexuals in the Old Testament. 
 The most prominent example was that of David and Jonathan.
59
 Bentham laid 
particular stress on I Samuel 1: 26: ‘I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan; very 
pleasant hast thou been unto me: thy love to me was wonderful passing the love of 
women.’ Bentham argued that the love of body to body was stronger than the love of 
mind to mind. Physical love between a man and a woman was stronger than any love 
of mind between one man and another. But Jonathan’s love to David was stated as 
being stronger than the love of women. Hence, Jonathan’s love to David must have 
been both the love of mind to mind and the love of body to body. 
But at the very outset of the story, the clearest exclusion is put upon any such 
notion as that the love of mind to mind, or in one word friendship, was in the 
case in question clear of all admixture of the love of body for body—in a word, 
of sexual love. Love at first sight? in the words of the title to the play
60—few 
incidents are more frequent: nothing can be more natural. But friendship at first 
sight—and friendship equal in ardency to the most ardent sexual love! At the 
very first interview, scarce had the first words that Jonathan ever heard of 
[David’s] issued from his lips, when the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul 
of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul. In a country in which the 
concupiscence of the whole male population of a considerable town is kindled 
                                                 
59
 Bentham picked out passages at I Samuel 17: 56–8, 18: 1–4; I Samuel 20: 17; and I Samuel 1: 17, 19, 
26, as evidence that their relationship was homosexual. 
60
 There were at least two eighteenth-century plays with that title: David Craufurd, ‘Love at First Sight. 
A Comedy’, London, [1704]; and Anon., ‘Love at First Sight: A Ballad Farce’, London, 1763. 
Jeremy Bentham: Prophet of Secularism—05/11/2012—Page 22 
to madness by a transient glimpse of a single man, what eye can refuse to see 
the love by which the young warriors Nisus and Euryalus were bound together 
in Virgil’s fable,61 and Harmodius and Aristogiton in Grecian history?62 
 
Bentham commented that it should not be matter of surprise that while, under certain 
circumstances in the classical world, the propensity was made capitally punishable, 
under other circumstances it was admired: 
considered as mere sensuality, it would be regarded with disapprobation, 
especially if running to excess—leading to excess in quantity as well as to 
aberration in respect of shape and quality: considered as a bond of attachment 
between two persons jointly engaged in a course of life regarded as 
meritorious, it might nevertheless be respected and applauded. 
 
Harmodius and Aristogiton, bound together by their homosexual relationship, had been 
celebrated in Athens as liberators from tyranny. The fortitude that the same sort of 
relationship had inspired amongst members of the Theban band had been the subject of 
‘universal admiration and elogium among the Greeks’.63 Relationships between 
Achilles and Patroclus and between Nisus and Euryalus, heroes of the Trojan War, had 
likewise been viewed with admiration.
64
 
  In relation to Jesus’s homosexuality, in the first place, there was, amongst 
Jesus’s followers, the youth with the ‘linen cloth cast around his naked body’ 
mentioned in Mark 14: 51–2 in the account of Jesus’s arrest in the Garden of 
Gethsemane. According to Bentham, the youth was a male prostitute, and given his 
loyalty to Jesus when all the other followers had fled, there must have existed a 
particularly strong bond of attachment between Jesus and the youth.
65
 In the second 
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place there was Jesus’s relationship with his disciple John, as portrayed in John’s 
Gospel. 
If in the love which, in and by these passages, Jesus was intended to be 
represented as bearing towards this John was not the same sort of love as that 
which appears to have had place between King David and Jonathan, the son of 
Saul, it seems not easy to conceive what can have been the object in bringing it 
to view in so pointed a manner, accompanied with such circumstances of 
fondness. That the sort of love of which, in the bosom of Jesus, Saint John is 
here meant to be represented as the object was of a different sort from any of 
which any other of the Apostles was the object is altogether incontestable: for 
of this sort of love, whatsoever it was, he and he alone is, in these so frequently 
recurring terms, mentioned as being the object. 
 
It might be objected that an attachment of this sort would not have been tolerated in 
Jesus’s time when it was ranked among capital crimes by the law of the land, and more 
especially by the law of God, and moreover had produced the destruction of Sodom 
and Gomorrah by supernatural means. In relation to the law of Moses, Bentham’s 
view, as noted above, was that Jesus held the law of Moses in scorn, thinking it merely 
a human law and ill-adapted to the welfare of society. The relevance of the story of 
Sodom and Gomorrah to Jesus’s relationship with John was at best superficial. The act 
which attracted supernatural punishment was not ‘the act of those who by mutual 
consent partake of the sort of gratification in question’, but rape, aggravated by the 
large number of persons who intended to partake in it, and thereby breaching the law 
of hospitality that was regarded as so important at that time. In actual fact, noted 
Bentham, the cities were probably set alight by lightening strikes, and the imagination 
of the priest who later wrote down the story had gone to work and fabricated the cause 
in a way that suited his purpose at the time.
66
 
 
VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF ASCETICISM 
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Bentham believed that Paul’s teaching remained central to the sexual morality of his 
own age. Paul’s modern followers, the adherents of the principle of asceticism, made 
‘war’ against both sexual gratification and the enjoyment of food and drink—referred 
to by Bentham as the pleasures of the bed and the pleasures of the table respectively. 
They could not exclude altogether the pleasures of the table since this would lead to 
the death of every individual. The ascetic did not want to exterminate the human race, 
since there would then be no ‘receptacle’ for pain. Indeed, once all pleasure had been 
removed, the ascetic was most anxious to preserve life, and the ‘parting with life to 
obtain deliverance in one and the same moment from all pains’ was ‘the most 
flagitious and unpardonable’ of sins. Unable to strike out completely the pleasures of 
the table, the ascetic had more room for manoeuvre in relation to the pleasures of the 
bed. An individual could be deprived of all pleasures of the bed, and yet continue to 
live. However, if the pleasures of the bed were totally forbidden, the human race 
would eventually become extinct, and once again pain, the only object that the ascetic 
valued, would disappear at the same time. ‘Therefore, to keep on foot so many 
receptacles of pain,’ noted Bentham, ‘the population must be kept up: and to the 
number of those in whose instance life is purified of all pleasure in this shape, limits 
must somehow or other be set.’ The problem for the ascetic was to work out how many 
breeders were necessary to keep up the greatest number of non-breeders, so that the 
greatest number possible could be denied the pleasures of the bed. At first glance it 
might appear that castration would be an appropriate means of producing the proper 
number of non-breeders, but this solution did not appeal to the ascetic, since ‘along 
with the pleasures, are excluded certain pains—the pains of unsatisfied desire’.67 
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 The ‘dæmon of asceticism’ had reserved its greatest hostility for sexual 
gratification ‘by that modification in which the sex is on both sides the male’. If 
asceticism were consistent, noted Bentham, it would have been equally critical where 
the sex was female on both sides, but asceticism had never been much concerned with 
consistency. The greater ‘physical impurity’ in the case of sexual activity between 
males compared with that between females had produced, in the imagination of the 
ascetic, a greater sense of ‘moral impurity’, and hence a greater demand for 
punishment.
68
 There were, however, two arguments, based on apparently reasonable 
(utilitarian) considerations, that were deployed to condemn homosexuality. The first 
objection was that homosexuality led to a decrease in population, and the second that it 
harmed the female sex. Both objections, in Bentham’s view, were groundless.69 
 In relation to the diminution of population, this was an argument, noted 
Bentham, that, no matter how widely accepted it had been in the past, would be 
unlikely to be used again in the future. The whole question had been transformed by 
the publication in 1798 of Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population,70 
which had warned of the tendency of population growth to outstrip subsistence: 
Ever since the great work of Malthus on this subject has had time to produce its 
effect, so far as concerns population, a truth which every thinking and even 
every influential mind without exception seems sufficiently possessed of is that 
every where it is from excess in this article that general human happiness has 
every thing to fear; from deficiency, nothing. 
 
Even so, homosexuality did not produce a ‘deficiency in population’. It only needed 
one out of the whole number of ‘sexual operations’ that the male was capable of 
performing in a year to create the maximum addition possible to the mass of 
population. However pleasurable the remaining three hundred or so operations 
(assuming the male capable of performing the operation once a day, and allowing for 
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sickness and absence in the course of the year), in terms of increasing the population, 
they were so much waste. In order to lead to a reduction in the population, ‘the 
propensity of this appetite to the same sex would have to be three hundred times as 
great as towards the correspondent and opposite sex’. This was evident nonsense, and 
if it were true, the term ‘eccentric’ would apply to the heterosexual rather than to the 
homosexual ‘conjunction’. Bentham made a further point. If all sexual activity was in 
the ‘eccentric modes’, then the species, at the end of a certain period, would be extinct. 
Yet the same result would ensue if males expended their whole sexual activity on 
females beyond the age of child-bearing. In other words, if homosexual conjunctions 
were condemned because of their purported effect on population, so should 
heterosexual conjunctions where pregnancy could not result.
71
 
 In the post-Malthusian age, homosexual relationships, insofar as they operated 
as a check on population, argued Bentham, were not an evil, but rather a remedy. 
Wherever there was a tolerable degree of security provided by government, the 
provision of subsistence would be overtaken by population growth. For the indigent, 
over-population resulted in ‘premature death preceded by lingering disease’; for the 
opulent, it resulted in the pain of privation to the extent that they provided relief for the 
indigent. But the very provision of relief in turn acted as a stimulant to the increase of 
population, and thence to the amount of indigence. Malthus had suggested that 
population was in fact checked by three causes: the first was ‘misery’, consisting in 
premature death through starvation; the second was ‘vice’, consisting in sexual 
gratification in an unprolific mode; and the third was ‘moral restraint’, whereby 
persons abstained from sexual gratification. Malthus, as was to be expected from a 
Church of England clergyman, noted Bentham, had recommended ‘moral restraint’. 
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Now, both the ascetic and the utilitarian agreed that the first check, premature death, 
was an evil. In regard to the second check, ‘vice’, the ascetic regarded it not only as an 
evil, but as a ‘remedy’ that was worse than the ‘disease’—over-population—itself. In 
contrast, the utilitarian regarded the so-called ‘vice’ not as an evil but as a good to the 
extent that it operated as a check upon population. The utilitarian, moreover, did not 
approve of ‘moral restraint’, since it involved two evils: 
1. loss of pleasure, by the amount of the capacity of gratification thus prevented 
from coming into act. 2. actual pain, viz. pain of unsatisfied desire, as measured 
by [i] the number of individuals in whose instance the desire, having existence, 
remains unsatisfied: ii. its intensity: and iii. its duration in the instance of each 
of them. 
 
Bentham concluded by stating that the means by which, according to the principle of 
utility, the evil of population growth might be checked was a subject well worth 
enquiring into, and he would do so in an Appendix. The Appendix has not been 
identified amongst Bentham’s surviving manuscripts—it may never have been 
written—but he may have intended to discuss either contraception or infanticide, or 
both.
72
 
 The second objection that had an apparently reasonable (utilitarian) basis was 
that homosexuality produced a deterioration in the condition of females. This 
objection, argued Bentham, seemed to have the same untenable basis as the first: 
namely that the desire in its eccentric shape predominated over the desire in its 
ordinary shape to the extent that males would prefer to have sex with other males on 
three hundred occasions rather than to have sex with a female on one occasion. There 
was no evidence, from any part of the world at any time, that this was the case. In the 
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East, where the eccentric propensity was condemned neither by law nor by opinion, 
‘the value set upon the charms of the female sex, and the importance attached to the 
possession of them, so far from falling short, exceeds any thing that is found 
exemplified in these western and northern regions. In an European, jealousy is as ice to 
fire in comparison of what it is in an oriental breast.’ The wretched state of females in 
the East was due to the despotism of the government, and not to the practice of 
homosexuality. In Italy and France, where homosexuality was much more common, 
the female sex had much greater authority than in Britain, ‘where the propensity is so 
rare’, and in Ireland, ‘where it is scarce known’. The married female had much more to 
fear from other females as rivals for the affection of her husband than from other 
males. Relying on the accounts of sexual practices in the classical world, Bentham 
argued that men ceased to be interested in other males when the latter had reached the 
age of twenty. Hence, the attractions of another male would tend to be ‘ephemeral’ to 
the husband, whereas those of another female had, as every one was aware, ‘no 
bounds’. It was the prostitute who had most to fear from the eccentric appetite.73 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
If reason and consistency, in other words the principle of utility, rather than the 
principle of asceticism, were the guide, argued Bentham, the pleasures of the bed 
would be treated with the same ‘indifference’ as the pleasures of the table. Just as with 
the table, individuals were left free to choose not only the ‘crude material’ that they ate 
but ‘the mode of cooking, seasoning and serving up’, so with the bed they would be 
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left free to choose: ‘with or without a partner—if with a partner, whether with a partner 
of the same species or with a partner of another species: if of the same species, 
whether of the correspondent and opposite sex or of the same sex: number of partners, 
two only or more than two’. In every instance, the ‘portions and parts of the body 
employed’ should be left to the free choice of the individuals concerned.74 Just as 
morality and religion did not interfere in the methods of cookery, so they should not 
interfere in the modes of sexual gratification. 
Thus it is that, according to the principle of utility, the pleasure, whatsoever it 
be, that may be capable of being derived from the pleasures of the bed—from 
the use of the sixth sense—from gratification afforded to the sexual appetite—
belongs not either to the field of religion or to the field of morality by any other 
title than does the pleasure of scratching where it itches.
75
 
 
As Crompton points out, Bentham’s insight was to think that what needed explanation 
was not same-sex relationships, but the hostility that the thought of such relationships 
produced in mainstream society.
76
 That led Bentham to point the finger at religion and 
the interest of religious leaders in promoting asceticism. Bentham’s views—and he 
would have been saddened by this—still have massive relevance nearly two hundred 
years after he wrote, whether in relation to the stoning of men and women for adultery 
in Afghanistan and Iran or the legal persecution of homosexuals in Africa. Perhaps he 
would not have been so surprised that the one attitude share by evangelical Christians 
and fundamental Moslems was homophobia. 
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